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Abstract-The Peruvian anchovy industry grew at a compound rate of 42 percent be- 
tween 1956 and 196.5, making Peru the largest fish producer in the \vor!d. Berxveen 1967 
and 1971 annual catches averaged 10.5 million metric tons. However. in 1972 the anom- 
alous ocean current known as El Nino combined with over-exploitation to decimate 
the anchovy stock. Anchovy harvests fell by 55 percent in 1972 and another 5 1 percent 
in 1973. Despite the efforts of the Institutio de1 Mar de1 Peru, an incomplete under- 
standing of the anchovy’s behavior and imperfect management practices led to severe 
economic hardship. 
This paper presents an anchovy population dynamics model implemented as a com- 
puter simulation. It incorporates aspects of several general population models in the 
literature, the peculiar characteristics of the anchovy ecosystem. and Peru’s specific 
economic needs. Our goal was to find the optimal management policy that can be prac- 
tically implemented and to develop a methodology that can be apphed to other situa- 
tions. The model indicated that Peru should limit fishing to the springtime and use quotas 
that favor large modern purse seiners. 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE PERUVIAN ANCHOVY INDUSTRY 
Commercial anchovy fishing was insignificant until 1956, when nylon nets were intro- 
duced. Thereafter it grew exponentially. In 1960 a fixed quota of 9.5 million metric tons 
was set to prevent overexploitation and to keep fishmeal prices from falling. This rigid 
policy was inappropriate for the complex dynamics of the anchovy ecosystem. 
In 1965, a relatively minor El Nino, an unpredictable ocean counter-current described 
in Appendix A, temporarily reduced anchovy stocks. As always. the guano, birds that 
depend on the anchovy for 80-95 percent of their food, died off in great numbers. This 
time, however, they could not recover because overfishing kept the anchovy population 
down. 
In 1972 the worst El Nino since 1891 struck. Its disruption of the anchovies’ habitat 
combined with the continued heavy fishing to severely deplete anchovy stocks. The pop- 
ulation still has not recovered sufficiently to support harvests in escess of 1 million metric 
tons. Appendix B gives additional historical background. 
The Peruvian anchovy merits a mathematical analysis of its population behavior for 
several reasons. First, it supports one of the world’s largest fishing industries. Peru de- 
pends on this industry for a significant fraction of its export earnings. Furthermore, the 
economic benefit derived could probably be increased substantially above today’s levels. 
Second, the system has several characteristics that make its response to exploitation 
counterintuitive. The background necessary to appreciate these peculiarities is given in 
the following two sections. Finally, the successful modeling of this complex system is an 
important case study in the application of general population models to specific situations. 
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THE PERUVIAN ANCHOVY 
The Peruvian anchovy inhabits a narrow, 1500 mile strip of water along the coast of 
Peru. The strong prevailing winds cause a constant northern flow of the surface water. 
The displaced water is replaced by nutrient-enriched upwellings that support heavy con- 
centrations of plankton. As a result, the area accounts for 22 percent of the world’s fish 
production (5). 
Anchovy larvae have very little food in their yolk so they must eat within hours of their 
birth. Under normal circumstances the upwellings provide the nourishment to support 
enough plankton for the larvae’s survival. Predation by copepods and other crustaceans 
is the primary cause of death, although, when population densities are high enough, the 
adults have been known to cannibalize their young (5). 
Females begin to spawn at the age of 12 months. There are two spawning periods each 
year. One in September produces about 75 percent of the eggs for the year. A smaller 
one in January produces the remainder (19). A single anchovy produces between 10,000 
and 20,000 eggs, and there is a direct relationship between fecundity and size (19). 
Because of this spawning behavior, the anchovy stock is divided into distinct age groups 
called cohorts. Anchovies less than 24 months old can be differentiated by size. Older 
anchovies are essentially identical. 
Anchovies have three enemies: guano birds, other fish, and man. Since 80 to 95 percent 
of the guano birds’ diet consists of adult anchovies, they are highly sensitive to fluctuations 
in the anchovy population. The predatory fish, on the other hand, are flexible in choosing 
their food supply; consequently, their population sizes are essentially independent of the 
anchovies (5). 
In 1958, man overtook the guano birds as the single largest predator. The total com- 
mercial catch increased to a maximum of 12 million tons in 1970. At any point in time, 
the anchovy stock was between 13.9 and 19.7 million tons, so this represents a very large 
percentage of the available stock (19). Only adult anchovies are harvested because those 
younger than 12 months are too small to be caught in the nets. 
THE EFFECT OF THE EL NINO 
Because El Nino stops the upwelling, it has devastating effects on the anchovy larva. 
El Nino almost always comes at Christmastime so the January spawning is usually de- 
cimated. Roughly 40 percent of the El Ninos last long enough to affect the larger September 
spawning. The warm water also brings a wave of natural enemies of the anchovies in- 
cluding dolphinfish, manta ray, and hammerhead shark (5). 
Nature tries to counteract these effects in two ways. First, females spawn throughout 
the year; there is no peak period. Second, after their preferred coastal waters have been 
completely submerged beneath the El Nino current, the anchovies scatter, overcoming 
their natural tendency to congregate in large schools. Scattering, followed by below- 
average anchovy populations resulting from the high anchovy larval fatality rate, has 
devastating effects on the guano birds. For example, during the 1965 El Nino, the pop- 
ulation dropped from 25 million to 5 million. The reduction in guano birds in turn helps 
the anchovies recover. 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
The population dynamics of the Peruvian anchovy have two salient characteristics: the 
spawning behavior of the anchovy and the El Nino phenomenon. A model for this eco- 
system must include both effects; consequently, none of the ones in the literature can be 
used directly. 
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The first problem presented by the spawning behavior is that it occurs at two distinct 
times each year that are not six months apart. Thus some age groups are absent during 
certain parts of the year. For example, there are no four month old anchovies in Septem- 
ber. As a result, differential equations are not appropriate for describing the anchovies’ 
population growth. Difference equations, on the other hand, are useful because the growth 
pattern can be modeled in discrete steps. The spawning periods, however, require a model 
that can handle three distinct seasons with varying fecundity functions. 
A model satisfying the above requirements might still be solved by analytic methods. 
However, the stochastic nature of El Nino makes a computer simulation necessary. The 
number of complications and nonlinearities in the model needed to show the effects of 
El Nino prohibit analytic solution. 
One final reason for customizing the model was the context in which the model would 
be used. The goal was not simply to maximize the anchovy harvest. Since the model was 
designed for government policy making, it should predict the consequences of each pos- 
sible combination of government-controlled parameters. The anchovy model provides the 
data necessary to establish an optimal policy. 
THE INITIAL MODEL 
The initial model describes the anchovy population growth and harvesting. There are 
six state variables, one for each cohort. The corresponding equations take one of three 
forms, depending on age. The oldest three cohorts are subject to harvesting and predation. 
Only predation affects fish that survive the larval stage but are still too small to be caught 
in the harvest. Infant mortality claims a very large percentage of the new born larvae. 
The equations are: 
X6[n + 11 = 
XS[n + 11 = 
X4[n + I] = 
X3[n + 11 = 
X2[n + I] = 
Xl[n + I] = 
Xl[n + l] = 
Xl[n + 11 = 
a6X6[n] + a5X5[n] - h5[n] - h6[n] 
a4X4[n] - h4[n] 
a3X3[nl - h3[nl 
a2X2[nl 
ulXl[n] 
b3X3[n] + b4X4[n] + bSXS{n] + 66X6[n] (Sept-Jan) 
(b3X3[n] + b4X4[n] + bSXS[n] + b6X6[n])/3 (Jan-May) 
0. (May-Sep) 
(1) 
The total harvest is expressed by (h3[n] . . . h6[n]). The harvest of each cohort (h3[n] 
is the harvest of the third age group) is proportional to the ratio of the mass of the cohort 
to total mass. 
Coefficients al through a6 describe predation by enemies other than the guano. A 
percentage of each cohort survives from one period to another. Since the younger cohorts 
are more vulnerable to predation, the total average losses of 30 percent per year are 
unevenly divided among the age groups (19). Appendix C describes these calculations. 
Varying fertility over the three spawning periods requires that the last difference equa- 
tion have three forms, with corresponding coefficients b3, 64, b5, and 66. These coeffi- 
cients are based on an infant mortality rate of 99.8 percent (5) and a fecundity relationship 
that expresses the number of eggs produced as a function of body length. Using data 
relating length to age, the coefftcients were determined (see Appendix C). These values 
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were weighted to give the appropriate relative levels of reproduction in September and 
January. 
The simulation interval is four months. Thus. Xl[n] represents the number of anchovies 
that are four months old, XZ[n] is the number that are eight months old and so forth. X6[r1] 
represents the number that have reached maturity (i.e. are twenty-four months or older). 
XO[n] was omitted and the birth rate was modeled implicitly because it would have an 
entirely different order of magnitude. 
INTERMEDIATE MODEL 
Guano birds were included explicitly in the model because they rely almost exclusiveI> 
upon anchovies for food and because they are the single largest natural predator. If an- 
chovies are plentiful, the guano bird population grows at a rate of 15 percent per year 
(5). This figure is not precise, so the PAMPER (Peruvian Anchovy Modeling Program for 
Economic Research) model ignores compounding and uses 5 percent growth per period. 
This leads to the pure birth equation: 
B[n + I] = 1.05.B[n] cl) 
B[n] is the population of the guano birds during the time period n. 
The average guano bird eats 35,460 anchovies per year, or 11.764 anchovies per period. 
Guanos prefer full-grown anchovies. Only anchovies over 20 months old are considered 
as targets for the birds. Guano birds have a greater chance of catching a full-grown ancho\-> 
(90 percent) than they do in catching one that is 20 month’s old (50 percent). 
Also, the birds are competing with the fishermen. Therefore, the average amount of 
food available is the number of fish, minus half the number caught by the fishermen. This 
number is divided by the number of fish needed (fish per bird * bird population) to gi\-e 
the ratio of available food to food required. If the ratio is greater than 100 percent the 
birds consume their average yearly amount. If not. there is a shortage of food. 
%Food = (0.9.(X6[n] - h6[n]/2) + O.j.(XS[n] - hj[,z]/Z))/(l I764.B[n]) 
When the anchovy stock can no longer support the entire guano bird population, some 
birds die. If the percentage of total food ever falls below one, then an expression relating 
fatality to the survival rate is needed to determine the number of birds that do not survive. 
The model uses a rising exponential to equate the two. This takes into account the fact 
that most guano birds can survive a small deviation below the minimum required amounr. 
Large deviations, however, cause massive population declines because the adults abandon 
their young. 
Also, the harvest of the current period modifies the fish stock. The question of who 
gets there first, the birds or the fishermen, is solved by subtracting half of the harvest 
from the current fish stock. If there is an abundance of anchovies, (%Food > 1) then the 
normal growth equation describes the population’s behavior. 
Figure 1 shows the graph of %Survival vs. %Food. One point on the line must be 
arbitrarily chosen in order to solve for the constant in the exponential. Under the as- 
sumption that 50 percent of the total desired food will keep 75 percent of the birds alive. 
the equation relating survival to food supply is: 
%Survival = 1.07 (1 - exp( -%Food.2.77)). 
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Fig. 1. 
The coefftcient 1.07 normalizes the equation so that 100 percent food supply gives a 100 
percent survival rate. 
This survival percentage modifies Eq. (2). If the %Food is less than 100, then the growth 
factor of 1.05 is decreased to reflect the guano bird fatality. The complete guano bird 
model is summarized below. 
%Food = (.9(X6[n] - h6[n]/2) + .5(XS[n] 
- h5[n]/2))/( 11764*B[n]) 
%Survival = 1.07 (1 - exp - (%Food*2.77)) 
B[n + I] = l.OS*B[n] if %Food > 1 
B[n + I] = l.OS.%Survival.B[n] if %Food I 1 
THE FULL MODEL 
The final step in combining the guano birds and anchovy population equations is to 
include the effect of bird predation on the fifth and sixth cohorts. The number of anchovies 
lost in the current period is the average guano population ((current + futureY2) multiplied 
by the number of fish eaten by a single bird. 
E[n] = ((B[n] + B[n + 1])/2).11764 
This parameter is subtracted from Eq. (1) because it depends on the previous values 
of both the 20 month old and adult anchovies. 
MINIMUM CONDITION CONSTRAINTS 
One important factor that has been ignored so far is the changing harvesting and pre- 
dation conditions that occur when the anchovy stocks are low. The population size places 
an absolute limit on the number of fish that can be caught at one time. (There is a higher 
lower limit also because it is not economically feasible to harvest low concentrations, 
especially for the older less efficient boats.) A lower limit was set for the values of X4[n], 
X5[n], X6[n] with respect to harvesting because fishermen cannot work profitably when 
the population is severely depleted. Predation by guano birds and other fish make it 
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possible that the other fishermen will not get any harvest at all. This inaccuracy is un- 
important because the harvests would be negligibly small. 
Consequently, the first three difference equations are conditional. If the intended har- 
vest would drive the population below its minimum level, the model assumes that the 
harvest is aborted and the birds and fish drive the anchovies to the minimum level. 
FECUNDITY 
One problem with the simple model for spawning behavior presented earlier is that it 
ignores the effect of population size on the birth rate. The model simulates this effect by 
reducing fecundity. The reproduction coefficients (b3, b4, b5, 66) are multiplied by a 
correction factor if the population grows beyond 20 million metric tons. 
Fecundity = (1 - ( 1 TB - 20 1 /20)“‘)‘, TB = Total Biomass 
The total biomass is simply the product of the population of each cohort and the average 
mass of the respective group. 
This causes the fertility to drop significantly for populations greater than the steady 
state value of 20 million metric tons (5). This reflects the fact that when the anchovy 
population gets very large, the offspring are smaller and the parents sometimes cannibalize 
their young. For populations below steady state, the equation is not used. 
FISHING TECHNOLOGY LEVEL 
Another important aspect of the model is the efficiency of the fishermen. Modern boats 
can continue to harvest profitably when the concentration of anchovies is low. This factor 
is easily included in the model by adjusting the minimum level that the anchovy population 
can have. The better the technology used by the fishermen, the lower the minimum fish 
population. The model was run with two technology levels. The minimum level of the 
second was twice that of the first. (Note that the model is not restricted to these two 
levels, but they were the only ones used.) 
THE ANCHOVY MODEL - EL NINO EFFECTS 
El Nino almost stops the upswelling of nutrients from the lower sea level. This drast- 
ically increases the mortality rate of the larvae. An entire cohort can be almost entirely 
wiped out (19). The model’s mortality values are multiplied by a factor of ten to take this 
into account. 
In addition, the anchovies spawn throughout the year. In the model, spawning is evenly 
divided among the three cycles of the year (19). 
El Nino’s warm currents bring predators so the survival coefficients, the percentage 
of anchovies that survive from one age group to the next, modifying equation (1) must 
be changed. 
The large schools of anchovies break up during El Nino periods, making it more difficult 
for both the birds and fishermen to catch them. The model includes this effect by increasing 
the minimum population level for each cohort. The model assumes that it is twice as hard 
for the fishermen to catch the anchovies after they scatter so the minimum number 
doubles. 
The model is now complete and ready to be tested. 
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THE COMPLETE PAMPER MODEL 
Inputs: Efficiency, Harvest 
%Food = (.9(X6[n] - h6[n]/2) + .5(XS[n] 
- hS[n]/2))lB[n]/( 11764.B[n]); 
if %Food > 1, then 
%Food = 1 
%Survival = 1.07(1 - exp - (%Food.2.77)) 
B[n + I] = l.O5*B[n] if %Food > 1 
B[n + l] = 1.05*%Survival.B[n] if %Food 5 1 
E[it] = ((B[n] + B[n + 1])/2)*11764 
X6[n + I] = a6X6[n] + a5X5[n] - hS[n] - h6[n] - E[nl 
XS[n + l] = a4X4[n] - h4[n] 
X4[n + 11 = a3X3[n] - h3[n]. 
531 
If X4, X5, or X6 is less than the minimum population level then the harvest for that group 
is zero (hi, h2, or h3 = 0). 
Recalculate the bird population 
X3[n + l] = u2X2[n] 
X2[n + l] = ulX2[n] 
Xl[n + l] = f.(b3X3[n] + b4X4[n] + bSXS[n] + &76X6[n]) (Sep-Jan) 
Xl[n + I] = (f/3)(b3X3[n] + b4X4[n] + bSX5[n] + b6X6[n]) (Jan-May) 
Xl[n + l] = 0 (May-Sep). 
If El Nino then 
1. All mortality coefficients divided by 10 (b3 . . . 64). 
2. All growth coefficients multiplied by .97 (al . . . ~6). 
3. Minimum population doubled. 
VERIFICATION OF THE MODEL 
Next a series of verification tests was performed. A simulation was set up with an El 
Nino every seven years which lasted for a full year. After each four month interval, the 
anchovy harvest, anchovy population, and guano bird population were reported. The first 
test was letting the simulation run for an arbitrarily long period of time, with moderate 
harvesting levels to see if the output variables stabilized. In all cases with reasonable 
starting conditions, the model reached an equilibrium oscillating pattern based on the El 
Nino occurence frequency. 
Stress tests were performed with extremely high and low harvest values. (See Figs. 
2-4.) At low values, the guano birds and anchovies formed an oscillatory ecosystem 
around El Nino. This is depicted in Fig. 2. The annual harvest of six million tons is 
maintained fairly constant, but the total biomass of the anchovies and the guano birds 
both have wide fluctuations and high peak values. With high harvest quotas the anchovy, 
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and consequently the guano bird, populations stabilize at low levels. Figure 3 shows that 
the harvest takes almost all of the available biomass at any given time. Also the guano 
population hovers around 2.3 million as opposed to 15 million in the underharvested case. 
Figure 4 shows a fairly maximal harvest pattern. Wide fluctuations decrease somewhat, 
but the interesting result is that the guano population follows its normal exponential growth 
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Fig. 3. 
until a sudden drop every 21 years. This coincides with every third El Nino. All three 
growth and harvest patterns all agree with intuition and data (19). 
The model responded as expected in a variety of situations when the stimuli was applied 
for a long time. Consequently, the model is useful for studying steady-state conditions. 
Next an attempt was made to duplicate historical. data. The figures for the harvesting 
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Fig. 4. 
strategies and resulting annual anchovy yields were compiled for the years of 1965 through 
1980 (see Table 1)(14, 17, 19). A steady-state condition was found for a summer veda and 
an annual harvest effort of twelve million tons. This state was used as the initial conditions 
for January 1965. Then the simulation was run using the harvest efforts for 1965 through 
1980. Figure 5 gives the results. The solid line represents the harvests predicted from the 
model. The dashed line shows the actual harvests. The figure also indicates that PAM- 
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Table 1. 
Year Vedas 
Effort 
(M tons) 
El Nino 
(months) 
Harvest 
(M tons) 
I%5 
1966 
1967 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
Summer 
8 
9 
10 
10 
10 
10 
IO 
7.2 
8.5 
9.8 
10.2 
10.5 (es0 
12.0 (est) 
10.5 
4.7 
2.3 
4.1 
3.4 
4.3 
2.5 
3.4 
3.7 
2.7 
Fig. 5. 
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PER’s values are not always exact. Harvests tend to be overestimated, however the 
relative magnitudes are always correct. This indicates that the PAhIER model can predict 
the results of particular harvesting strategies. 
Clearly, although these tests were very encouraging, they were not sufficient to stake 
Peru’s economy on its results. Further testing would ensure that the model is tlexible and 
accurate enough for an application of that importance. 
POLICY GOALS 
What harvest policy should Peru adopt? That question has two parts. First, what is 
the long term optimal policy? Second, how should the transition from the current un- 
deremployed state be made? Time constraints prevented the extensive simulation testing 
necessary to answer the second question, but Appendix D discusses aspects of the prob- 
lem. The first question is addressed in this paper. 
Peru’s economic goals must be delineated before policies can be proposed. One goal 
is increasing national income, and in particular increasing export revenues to ease the 
balance of payments burden. Full employment is a second, sometimes conflicting goal. 
At present, only a fraction of Peru’s 30,000 fishermen are fully employed. Furthermore, 
Peru’s labor force is expected to grow at an annual rate of 3.3 percent throughout this 
century (17). Distributional issues are related to underemployment. Peru has a dual econ- 
omy, and its distribution of income is very unequai. Its Lorenz curve has one of the 
highest Gini coefficients of inequality in the world(l4). 
Externalities also need to be considered. Fish processing plants emit foul smelling, 
sometimes toxic, fumes. The stench lowers the standard of living along the 260 mile long 
coastal region where 85 percent of the processing plants are located. Equally important. 
it has prevented a tourism industry from developing. Harvesting anchovies also has a 
severe impact on the guano fertilizer industry because the birds depend almost exclusively 
on anchovies for food. 
POLICY OPTIONS 
The Peruvian government has two effective mechanisms for controlling the anchovy 
harvest. First, it controls the length of the fishing season by declaring vedas. moratoriums 
on fishing. This paper refers to the seasons as they occur in the northern hemishpere. 
That is, a summer veda refers to prohibiting fishing during June, July, and August. 
Table 2. Effects of policy options on Peru’s economy 
Vedas 
Tourism 
WSlyr) 
Semi-skilled 
processing plant 
jobs per M ton 
harvest 
Low-Tech Hi-Tech 
unskilled semi-skilled 
jobs jobs 
none 
spring 
summer 
fall 
sum & fall 
spr & sum 
spr & fall 
all 
0.0 800 
IO.1 800 
IO.5 800 
Il.1 800 
25.5 800’ 
24.0 8001 
25.1 800’ 
39.9 - 
2100 
2200 
2200 
ZlOO 
x00* 
2x0* 
2100’ 
- 
S8.6M per 
bl tons 
800 
800 
800 
800 
SOQ* 
800’ 
800’ 
- 
Sl l.SM per 
Si tons 
* Indicates job lost less than half the year plus 91.07M per million guano-birds. 
Note that a larger model would account for people employed by tourism and guano- 
bird industries. (Two thousand tourists employ - 1,000 people directly). 
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The second mechanism is a quota enforced by issuing licenses. Licensing allows the 
government to discriminate for or against specific groups. Favoring modem purse seiners 
or the individually owned bolicheras is referred to as the high-tech option. It is more 
profitable than the low-tech alternative because larger trawlers have more machinery per 
fisherman, reducing labor costs. However, the opportunity to own a bolichera gives fish- 
ermen a chance to move up into the middle class. The high tech option creates more 
income and tax revenues per ton of anchovies harvested, but it exacerbates underem- 
ployment and the unequal distribution of wealth. 
Table 2 shows the matrix of policy options and their effects on national income, em- 
ployment, and the tourism industry. The guano industry indirectly depends on the policy 
chosen because of its effect on the anchovy stock. Appendix E describes how these 
relations were derived. 
APPLICATION OF THE MODEL 
After the PAMPER model was verified, it was used to find the optimal harvesting 
policies for the Peruvian anchovies. A simulation was created which accepted harvesting 
effort levels per season as input. Harvest efforts correspond to the government’s quotas. 
Strict quotas lower the harvest effort, and lenient ones increase the effort because there 
is always a surplus of fishermen. Two values could be entered if a different policy were 
desired for El Nino periods. 
Next, the fishermen’s efficiency rating was set. A large value reflected a predominance 
of modern purse seiners that would be favored by the high-tech option. The low-tech 
option used a lower value because the bolicheras cannot harvest profitably when the 
anchovy concentrations are low. In the model, this factor determined how low the fish- 
ermen could drive the anchovy population. One hundred year simulation runs were used 
to find the steady state annual harvest. The output included the average anchovy harvest, 
anchovy population, and guano bird population. 
The harvest effort levels that maximize the annual anchovy yield were found for each 
set of policy alternatives. A policy alternative is a technology level combined with a 
Table 3. Harvest effort (M tons) 
Steady-state 
Sep-Jan Jan-May May-Sep harvest 
Reg El Nino Reg El Nino Reg El Nino (M tons) 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
6 6 
9 
10 
II 
12 
13 
14 
14 
13 
13 
13 
9 
13 
6 
8 8 8 8 
9 9 9 9 
4 
7 
0 
0 
0 
0 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
I4 
13 
13 
9 
9 
13 
9 
6 
4 
3 
2 
0 
0 
0 
11.19 
12.90 
15.49 
16.56 
17.45 
17.74 
18.36 
17.16 
18.08 
18.30 
17.81 
17.82 
17.76 
17.21 
1 I .68 
13.48 
14.97 
13.86 
Note: Fall Veda (efficiency = I). 
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harvest pattern. A harvest pattern consists of 6 effort levels, one for each of the three 
seasons during El Nino periods and non-El Nino periods (see Table 3). The method used 
was to test a harvest pattern at varying levels. When an optimal level for that particular 
pattern was found, perturbations were added to find the absolute maximum harvest. This 
method involves adjusting each of the parameters by a small amount and observing the 
output. If it goes up, then movement is continued in that direction. Otherwise the other 
direction is tried. By repeating this process for each of the parameters, an approximate 
maximum solution can be found. Because of time constraints, only about 20 trials were 
run for each of the 28 policy options, but this technique of finding close suboptional 
solutions and then adjusting the parameters produced good results. 
It should be noted that several slightly suboptimal solutions use widely different har- 
vesting patterns. This fact attests to the complexity of the systems. Also. none of the 
maxima are asymptotic, as is the case for many over-simplified models. This confirms 
that the counterbalancing effects of over- and under-fishing acted as they should have. 
Results such as these show the well-balanced cause and effect relationships in the model. 
Throughout the verification and application of the PAMPER model, reasonable and 
useful results were obtained. This lends confidence to the final answers obtained. 
RESULTS 
Can the anchovy industry stimulate industrialization? 
The ideal policy would recreate the spectacular growth of the 1960s triggering the 
economic take-off that transforms a developing nation into an industrialized one. The 
revolutionary government may have been pursuing this policy when it originally depleted 
the anchovy stocks, so it is important to determine if this goal is feasible. It is extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, to predict the minimum stimulation required to lead to indus- 
trialization. Based on the analysis given in Appendix E, the 1960s harvests stimulated the 
economy by approximately $304M per year. (Note: As explained in hppendix E, values 
are given in 1967 U.S. dollars.) 
The computer model for the anchovies and the analytic model for the economy were 
synthesized by inserting the harvest figures and guano bird populations for each polic) 
option into the macroeconomic equations. There results were used to determine the op- 
timal policy. The maximum value generated for any policy was S239.4M (see Table 4). 
Consequently, Peru cannot depend on the anchovy industry alone to generate enough 
income to trigger industrialization. 
Maximum sustainable yield 
The high-tech option with spring and fall vedas would generate S239.4ht’yr. However. 
this may not be the best policy choice for two reasons. First, it assumes that El Nino can 
be forecasted accurately enough to adjust the fishing effort exerted to implement a flexible 
policy. As a result of the extensive studies done after the 1952 and 1983 El Ninos, this 
probably could be done (also see Appendix A). However, quotas and vedas would have 
to be set frequently so they would be flexible enough to prevent overharvesting during 
El Nino. Thus, fishermen could never plan very far ahead. Second, this policy calls for 
significantly reducing the fishing effort during El Nino periods. Consequently, every seven 
years or so, only a fraction of the fishermen would be working. 
The high-tech, summer and fall veda, constant harvest effort combination does not 
suffer from either of these flaws. It would generate $234,9M/yr. which is only slightly less 
than the maximizing policy. Also, it is easier to administer, and it would not cause as 
many fluctuations in employment. The predicted output for this policy is: average harvest 
Population dynamics of the Peruvian anchovy 
Table 4. Total income for policy options 
539 
Veda 
Harvest Effort 
SDT sum 
(M tons) Harvest 
fall (M tons) 
Guano Tourism 
POP revenues 
(M) (SW 
Fishmeal Total 
industry (SM) 
SPr 
Hl) 
L:; 
2) 
Fall 
Hl) 
2) 
Ll) 
2) 
Sum 
HI) 
L:; 
2) 
Spr & Sum 
Hl) 
2) 
LI) 
2) 
Spr & Fall 
HI) 
2) 
Ll) 
2) 
Sum & Fall 
Hl) 
L:; 
2) 
None 
Hl) 
2) 
Ll) 
2) 
0 9 9 17.38 1.48 10. I 199.9 211.5 
OiO 1014 1213 18.56 1.34 10.1 213.4 224.8 
0 9 9 13.79 2.72 10.1 118.6 131.4 
010 1214 1214 20.14 1.87 10.1 173.2 185.2 
a a 0 14.97 1.63 11.4 17?.2 141.7 
1310 13/O o/o 18.36 1.03 11.1 311.1 170.3 
12 12 0 18.95 2.16 11.4 163.0 176.5 
1610 16/l 0 18.70 2.20 11.1 160.8 174.1 
6 0 
1212 0 
6 0 
IO/J 0 
9; 
6 
1 l/3 
11.76 3.99 10.5 135.2 149.7 
17.70 1.70 10.5 203.6 215.8 
11.26 5.11 10.5 96.8 112.4 
17.93 1.86 10.5 154.2 166.6 
0 
o/o 
0 
o/o 
0 
010 
0; 
15 14.85 2.47 24.0 170.8 197.2 
2012 15.68 1.06 24.0 180.3 205.4 
19 17.46 1.72 24.0 150.2 175.9 
18/5 15.15 2.07 24.0 130.3 156.4 
0 18 0 16.73 1.17 
010 2415 010 18.54 1.13 
0 19 0 17.18 2.04 
o/o 3015 010 20.18 2.48 
192.4 218.7 
213.2 239.4 
147.7 174.9 
173.5 201.1 
20 0 0 18.15 0.69 
30/2 010 010 18.19 0.96 
18 0 0 16.55 1.91 
2512 o/o 010 17.69 2.15 
208.7 234.9 
209.2 235.6 
142.3 169.7 
152.1 179.8 
5 5 5 14.38 4.43 0.0 165.4 169.8 
811 811 811 17.77 1.59 0.0 204.4 205.9 
7 7 7 17.52 3.81 0.0 150.7 154.5 
1112 1112 1 l/2 15.87 4.22 0.0 136.5 140.7 
M = Millions 
H = Using high technology harvesting 
L = Using low technology harvesting 
I = Assumes harvest effort remains constant El Ninos 
2 = Harvest effort may change during El Nino 
/ = Harvest during regular times/during El Nino 
of 18.15 million metric tons of anchovies, $690,000 in revenues from the guano industry, 
$25.5M in revenues from the tourism industry, and $208.7M in fishmeal revenues. 
The best low-tech policy is spring and summer vedas yielding $201.151 in income if 
quotas are flexible enough to account for El Nino periods. If they are not, income gen- 
erated falls to $174.9M, which is still better than any other low-tech option. Policy-makers 
more familiar with the severity of Peru’s unemployment problem would have to evaluate 
the trade off between this reduced income and the 2200 extra unskilled jobs the low-tech 
policy creates. 
Another conclusion that can be drawn from Table 4 is that continuous harvesting and 
summer vedas result in the largest guano populations. This is expected because it is the 
fluctuations in the anchovy population even more than the low levels that is detrimental 
for the birds. However, no matter what policy is followed, maximum harvesting will never 
allow the guanos to recover to their pre-1965 levels. 
540 ROBERT C. B.~ETT. JONATHAN P. C l LKINS. and ANDREW J. Y.~TES 
FURTHER WORK 
Additional model validation could be done. The PAlMPER model appears to work well 
under a variety of conditions. but the time constraint made it impossible to test all pos- 
sibilities. Duplicating the 1982 El Nino would be a particularly good test because it was 
a strong and well documented event. Unfortunately, that data was not available. 
An analysis of the effects of varying El Nina’s characteristics would be valuable. Policy 
alternatives could be tested against a randomly generated distribution of events to check 
how robust they are. Evaluations could be made, based on criteria such as maximizing 
the minimum anchovy population or minimizing the chance of driving the anchovy or the 
guano bird to extinction. 
Several improvements could be made to the model. In particular, the analysis of Peru’s 
economy was cursory. It was difficult to obtain contemporary data, and any attempt to 
apply the model to the current situation must take this into account. The model itself 
could be improved by subdividing the four month simulation intervals. This would elim- 
inate problems such as competition between different predators for the same anchovies. 
In addition. it would more accurately reflect the guano birds’ dependence on the 
anchovies. 
Another refinement would be subdividing the population geographically. Even though 
the anchovies are highly mobile, there is some evidence that the overall population is 
divided into two groups, one north and one south of 1.5 degrees south latitude. Further- 
more, El Nino’s effect on the width of the coastal current could be modeled explicitly. 
However, it’s unlikely that these added details would significantly affect the results. 
The approach taken by the PAMPER model worked so well for the Peruvian anchovy 
that it should be tried uith other species. Generality is what makes a model truly valuable. 
PAMPER might be able to simulate the collapse of the California sardine industry in the 
1960s without many modifications. Hopefully, it could prevent similar tragedies at other 
fisheries. 
It would also be worthwhile to apply PAMPER to several dissimilar species to see how 
flexible it is. Many other animals’s offspring are born in groups. Even if this particular 
implementation cannot be applied directly, its approach of embedding relatively simple 
population models in a matrix of difference equations which track the development of 
individual cohotis might be quite general. 
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APPENDIX A: THE EL NINO PHENOMENON 
El Nino generally begins around Christmastime when the prevailing southeast winds off of the 
shore of Peru change and bring moist air from the west. Severe rain and windstorms cause dev- 
astating floods in the desert region along the Pacific coast. Because the coastal current is no longer 
driven by the southeast winds, the upwelling of the undercurrent almost stops. The region’s abun- 
dant phytoplankton depend on nutrients brought up from the ocean bottom by these upwellings; 
consequently, El Nino disrupts the food chain by reducing the number of primary producers that 
convert the sun’s energy into a form that is available to other sea life. The changing winds also 
reinforce the usually weak countercurrent bringing warmer water into the region where the Peruvian 
anchovies live. The warmer water carries sea life that is not indigenous to the area, including species 
that feed on anchovies. The reprecussions affect the entire Peruvian ecosystem, but the anchovies 
and guano birds are particularly hard hit. 
The phenomenon seems to occur periodically, but attempts to forcast its return have been un- 
successful. When applying statistical methods to predict the next El Nino, the literature apparently 
uses a straightforward least-squares fit to the graph of El Nino occurrences versus years. This 
approach leads to a mean interarrival period of 7.18 years with a standard deviation of 0.39 years 
and a correlation cofficient of 0.984 (see Table A.l). However, upon examining the El Nino fre- 
quency data, it becomes apparent that the events are being recorded with increasing frequency. 
Rather than attribute this to changing environmental conditions, it is logical to assume that in the 
past, milder El Ninos might have been missed if no one was looking for them. This conjecture is 
supported by the fact that the interval between El Ninos is usually four or five years, sometimes 
eight or nine years, but rarely anything else. 
Table Al. 
Year 
interval 
(years) 
Std occurrence Theor occurrence 
number number 
1911 
1917 
1925 
1932 
1940 
1952 
1957 
1%5 
1%9 
1972 
1976 
1982 
- 
6 
8 
7 
8 
12 
5 
8 
4 
4 
6 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
4 
6 
8 
10 
11 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
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This implies that when eight or nine years elapsed between successive El Ninos, a weaker, 
unrecorded event happened in between the two. Further support for this theory comes from the 
report of the expedition that examined the 1976 El Nino. It states that the phenomenon would not 
have been noticed if that expedition had not been explicitly searching for it[19]. 
Applying this theory to the data using least-squares techniques gives a mean interarrival period 
of 4.38 years with a standard deviation of 0.07 years and a correlation coefficient of 0.999. The 
reduction in standard deviation by a factor of five added to the greatly increased correlation coef- 
ficient lends a great deal of credence to this theory. 
APPENDIX B: THE HISTORY OF THE PERUVIAN ANCHOVY INDUSTRY 
Modem fishing began in Peru during World War II when bonito were sold to the U.S. as tuna, 
but USDA regulations closed that market in 1949. One year later the first plant opened to reduce 
anchovies to fishmeal for hog and chicken feed. Unlike cows, these animals only have one stomach 
so they cannot assimilate all the essential amino acids from plants. 
The anchovy industry grew slowly until 1956 when nylon nets replaced weak, water absorbent 
cotton ones. This simple innovation increased profitability enough to stimulate heavy investment 
and growth. The traditional bolichera, small fishing boats. began to be replaced by larger trawlers 
and purse seiners. Echo location, power blocks, and purse seines increased productivity by a factor 
of ten. Figure B-l summarizes the industry’s growth from 1955 to 1970. 
Together, the fishmeal industry and the Toquepala copper mine were responsible for one of the 
Third World’s most impressive growth records. blichael Roemer[ 141 cites Peru as a classic example 
of the staple theory of export-led growth. This theory attempts to explain how one primary com- 
modity can stimulate an economy to take-off and industrialize. The parallel with Canada’s growth 
between 1901 and 1911 is particularly strong. 
Anchovy fishing stimulated several other industries including: shipbuilding, processing equip- 
ment fabrication, pump manufacture, netting, and the production ofjute bags to hold the processed 
meal. Including these secondary effects, the anchovy industry accounted for 15.6 percent of all 
investment in Peru[ 141. 
In 1960 Peru asked the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for help managing its 
fisheries to avoid depleting the anchovy stock and to stop the decline infishmeal prices. The Instituto 
de1 Mar de1 Peru set yearly quotas of 9.5 million tons. This level of exploitation stressed the pop- 
ulation, but catches remained high because more and more effort was expended to harvest the fish. 
In 1965 a relatively minor El Nino occurred. As always, the anchovy population fell and millions 
of guanos, birds that depend on anchovies for 80-95 percent of their diet, perished. This time, 
however, over-fishing prevented the guanos from recovering. This crippled the guano fertilizer 
industry which had exported protein-rich guano feces for fertilizer since the 19th century. 
At Christmastime 1971 the worst El Nino since 1891 struck. Fishing continued normally through 
the early spring of 1972 because El Nino’s warm waters initially compressed the cool coastal current 
that the anchovies prefer into pockets, thus concentrating the anchovy population where it was 
easiest to harvest. Consequently, traditional harvest per unit effort measures were lagging indi- 
Year 
1951 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1%3 
Registered Processing Anchovy Fishmeal 
Bolicheras Plant Capacity Harvest Production 
(metric tons(hour) (Thousands of metric tons) 
7.2 
126 
175 55.8 20.0 
220 139 118.9 30.6 
272 242 325.9 64.5 
321 568 739.1 126.9 
426 880 1946.8 332.4 
731 1560 3313.1 558.3 
846 2282 5010.9 835.1 
1070 4119 6691.5 1112.6 
1523 6553 6634.8 1129.4 
Fig. Bl. Growth of the Peruvian anchovy industry. 
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caters. By April, when the effects were detected, the spawning population had been severely de- 
pleted. Then, when the last coastal pockets of cool water were submerged beneath El Nino, the 
remaining anchovies scattered, and by June none were caught. 
The government banned fishing until March, 1973. At that time 1 million metric tons were har- 
vested in three weeks, again depleting the stock. A quota of 800,000 tons was set for April, but 
the entire fleet could only harvest 400,000 tons. At that point, the government nationalized the 
fishing industry to control fishing and let the anchovy population recover. 
Catches in the 1970s never exceeded 4 million metric tons. The anchovy industry had severely 
over-expanded. In 1963 there were 42 shipyards operating, capable of producing 1200 bolicheras 
per year, enough to double the fleet. Fewer than half a dozen shipyards remain. Even in the peak 
production years, less than 50 percent of the registered bolichera were in use. Today only a few 
of the biggest modem seiners are necessary to take the reduced harvests. Similarly, by 1965 there 
were 175 processing plants that could handle approximately 3.8 times the maximum allowable catch 
of 9.5 M metric tons[l4]. In sum, the anchovy industry has been severely underemployed since 
1972. 
APPENDIX C: CALCULATION OF THE MODEL’S COEFFICIENTS 
The coefficients al, ~2, ~3, ~4, 05, and a6 were determined by assuming that the 30 percent 
predation rate was spread unevenly among the cohorts. The xl group lost 60 percent each year, 
but the adults lost only 15 percent. The remaining predation rates were distributed linearly between 
these two endpoints. The groups and their respective survival rates (1 - loss percentage per year) 
are listed in Table Cl. To the right of these numbers is the survival rate per four month period, 
which is simply the cube root of the annual survival rate. 
The spawning coefficients 63, b4, b5, and b6 were slightly more complicated. The relationship 
between fecundity and length (in cm) is: F = 24OOL - 19800[19]. This equation was combined with 
data relating the anchovies’ length and age to determine the spawning capabilities of each cohort. 
Table C2 summarizes the spawning coefficient calculations. Since only half of the population is 
female, the l/2 Female correction is needed to ensure that only half of the fish lay eggs. Total 
spawning is divided unequally between September and June as indicated in the last two columns. 
Offspring of adolescent mothers have an even greater mortality rate (99.98%), which is indicated 
by the asterisks. 
Table Cl 
Cohort 
Annual survival Period survival 
rate (%) rate (%) 
Xl 40 74 
x2 49 79 
x3 58 83 
X4 67 88 
X5 76 91 
X6 85 95 
Table C2. 
Cohort 
Age 
(mo) 
Length 
(cm) 
Fecundity 
(# eggs) 
99.8% 
Fatality 
1 
Female 75%( Bn) 25%( Bn) 
x3 12 11.1 6840 2.72* 1.36* 1.02 0.34 
x4 16 13.0 11400 22.80 11.40 8.55 2.85 
X5 20 14.0 13800 27.60 13.80 10.35 3.45 
X6 24 15.0 16200 32.40 16.20 12.15 4.05 
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APPENDIX D: OPTIMAL HARVEST POLICY FOR THE TR_L\NSITION TO STEADY 
STriTE 
Once the optimal longrun harvest policy has been established, there is still the question of how 
to make the transition from the current state to the optimal one. Generally, rapid changes cost more 
than gradual ones. For example, it might be desirable to reduce the number of fisherman by 6,000, 
but new jobs might not be available for all of them at once. However, if the transition were made 
more slowly, the anchovy industry would be operating sub-optimally in the interim. The basic 
dilemma is how to trade off present and future costs and benefits. 
R. M. Solow[l6] wrote an excellent article explaining why the standard business practice of 
computing net present value is inadequate. Businesses always strive to maximize profit. Intangibles 
such as public relations must be assigned values, but businesses usually have to account for fewer 
subjective effects than governments. Also, businesses are unconcerned with normative issues such 
as income distribution. 
More significantly, businesses can base their calculations on the market interest rate, which 
reflects individuals’ time preference for money. Society’s time preference for money is lower for 
several reasons. First, individuals and businesses are mortal. People are concerned for their chil- 
dren’s welfare, but even the most caring parents are likely to indulge themselves to a certain extent. 
Second, society is unconcerned with the risk of income transfers within that society. Someone 
might prefer 91 now over S5 in ten years if they are afraid it might be stolen in the mean time. 
Distributional issues aside, the society’s well-being is not affected. 
One could argue that governments are immortal and that they represent the entire society equally 
so they overlook such interpersonal transfers. It is a difficult case to make, particularly for countries 
prone to unstable authoritarian regimes. Even if such an immortal institution were found, its policy 
makers would still be mortal. If popular opinion had any effect on their career, or even their ego, 
they would favor the current generation. 
What discount rate should society use then’? It is possible that there should be no discounting 
whatsover because the welfare of present and future citizens are of equal importance. However, 
if one expects the future generation to be wealthier, the law of diminishing returns states that a 
dollar spent today will yield more utility than a dollar saved. 
The above argument suggests that society’s discount rate is equal to the real growth in per capita 
income. That figure is very difficult to estimate for Peru, and it may even be zero. A value of 1 
percent is assumed for this discussion. Estimating the real interest rate is no easier because of 
Peru’s high and variable inflation, but 10 percent is not unreasonable. 
It is easy to construct simple examples for which this discrepency leads to different policies. 
Say the current anchovy harvest is worth $75M and the government has the option of reducing the 
harvest to $jOM for ten years, allowing the anchovy population to build up sufficiently to support 
harvest worth SlOOM from that point on. Standard net present value analysis gives a value of $825M 
for continuing steady harvesting and S73lM for temporarily reducing the harvest to allow the an- 
chovy population to grow. The corresponding values using a discount rate of 1 percent are $7,575h1 
and $9,617M respectively. Thus, using the market discount rate, the temporary consenation policy, 
which would be of greater benefit to society in the long run, would not be taken. 
El Nino’s unpredictability makes it particularly difficult to establish an optimal transition policy 
for harvesting Peruvian anchovies. It would take a lot of computer time to simulate all of the possible 
El Nino patterns over the transition period. Even if this were done, El Nino is too poorly understood 
to assign probabilities to each pattern and calculate an expected benefit. However. the simulation 
model would allow policy makers to compare the effects of several alternatives under a series of 
typical El Nino patterns. This finite representative sample could be analyzed subjectively or criteria 
such as maximizing the minimum net value, minimizing maximum flucuations in employment, or 
minimizing the chances of driving the anchovies or guano birds to extinction could be applied. 
APPENDIX E: DERIVATION OF POLICY OPTIONS AND THEIR VALUES 
Extent of the Peruvian government’s control 
The Peruvian government’s ability to optimize the anchovy harvest is limited in several ways. 
First, the system is not completely observable. That is, no one knows the anchovy stock’s size or 
age distribution when policy decisions are made. For example, the April 1973 quota was set at 
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800,000 tons even though heavy fishing was only able to harvest 400,000 tons. Consequently, policies 
should be satisfactory for any possible population size and robust enough so that even if an El 
Nino event occurred, the anchovies would not be wiped out as they were in 1972-1973. Forcasting 
El Nino’s return is discussed in Appendix A. 
Realistically, even if policy makers had complete knowledge of the system’s state. implementing 
optimal policies would not always be possible because the system is not comp!etely controllable. 
or at least not economically controllable. Quotas must be set sufficiently far in advance for fishermen 
to plan. For example, if a large trawler captain knew of a 3 month veda, an expedition to another 
fishery could be undertaken. Similarly, artisan fisherman could return to their balsilla rafts and 
harvest fish for human consumption. It is inefftcient and unreasonable to expect fishermen to be 
on call like doctors, In this sense, the system is analogous to some electric circuits which are 
mathematically controllable, but practically they require too much energy to make it cost-effective 
to fine tune their performance. 
Quotas 
Historically two control policies have proven feasible. This paper’s analysis does not depend 
on the existence of other untried techniques. Quotas, which the government has traditionally let 
the National Fishing Society administer, are the first mechanism. The quotas are actually export 
licenses, but because the vast majority of lishmeal is exported they are effective. The National 
Fishing Society’s peculiar by-laws and voting precedures have given large producers a dispropor- 
tionate say in the organization’s actions. Consequently, even though it has not been the govern- 
ment’s intention, policy has tended toward the high-tech alternative by favoring large modem ves- 
sels at the expense of the less efficient, privately-owned bolicheras. Politically, it might be somewhat 
awkward for the government to begin administering the licensing, but it is not adverse to dramatic 
measures as the 1973 industry nationalization demonstrated. 
Limiting boat size is a possible alternative method for accomplishing the same end. As the 
industry modernized, boats became progressively larger. Thus it might be possible to implement 
the low-tech alternative without revoking the National Fishing Society’s special status. 
Vedas 
Peru has used vedas, or moratoriums, to restrict the fishing season since 1965. They are easy 
to enforce because there is no incentive to harvest anchovies if the processing plants are not op- 
erating, and their odiferous wastes make it very difficult to process fish undetected. However, the 
vedas have several conflicting effects. 
First, fishing is most efficient when the harvest per unit effort ratio is highest. The ratios are 
highest between January and IMarch, lowest during the summer, and moderate throughout the fall 
months. Consequently summer vedas are the least costly in the short run. On the other hand, year 
round fishing minimizes seasonal fluctuations in employment. Also, some fishermen can find other 
work as described above. Annual vedas would allow some tourism. In particular, Chimbote’s 
beaches could attract tourists if the vedas shut down the processing plants regularly. The vedas 
also affect anchovy reproduction, and the model demonstrates that the nature of these effects are 
substantial and not intuitively obvious. 
There are seven possible veda policies: continuous harvest, spring, summer, fall, spring and 
summer, spring and fall, and summer and fall vedas. Combining these choices with the high-tech 
and low-tech options gives a 2 x 7 matrix of policies to evaluate. 
COMPUTATION OF THE VALUE OF THE ANCHOVY HARVEST 
All of the following figures are given in 1967 dollars for two reasons. First, 1967 is the base year 
used to find the relative values of U.S. dollars after inflation. Second, the source with the most 
detailed information about the anchovy industry’s effects on Peru’s economy, Michael Roemer’s 
“Fishing for Growth,” only had data through 1968. Working forward from raw data and backward 
from the net effects given by Roemer, a simple Leontief model was constructed to establish the 
linkages with other industries (see Table El). In the 1967 column, figures to the left of the slashes 
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Table El. Anchovy industry’s effect on the economy 
1967 
1980 
High tech Low tech 
Revenues: 
Exports 
Domestic 
Borrowing 
Total: 
Expenditures: 
investment 
Boat Construction 
Factory Construction 
Processing Equipment 
Total: 
Intermediate Goods 
Boat Equipment 
Maintenance 
Netting 
Jute Bags 
Paper Bags 
Petroleum Products 
Power 
Transportation 
Insurance 
Interest 
Total: 
Labor 
Wages 
Government 
Taxes 
Net stimulus on economy: 
Wages 
Domestic Spending 
(Total Invstent + Govt.) 
X (multiplier = 2.77) 
Total: 
Imports 
Total Benefit to Society 
157.5 
2.4 
20.0 
179.9 
20.0/20.0 
5.015.0 
I .0/2.0 
26.0126.0 
1.011.2 
5.015.0 
7.5 
.813.2 
.3/1.1 
9.011.6 
1.0 
7.4 
2.1 
6.2516.25 
41.45/18.35 
54.0 
13.2 
54.0 2.5 4.25 
67.45 5.618 5.618 
108.58 2.0 _ 2.69 
260.0 10.1 7.’ 
44.25 
304.45 
I .40 
Il.5 
I .A0 
8.6 
10.3 
10.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
.25 
1.25 
s25 
.9975 
0.0 0.0 
2.5 2.5 
,125 .I25 
1.0 1.0 
,375 .375 
0.0 0.0 
7.0225 6.025 
2.5 1.25 
,721 - .9725 
10.3 
10.3 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
.25 
1.25 
,525 
.9975* 
Note: 1967 figures are the result of an 8 million metric ton harvest. 1980 figures are per 
million metric tons harvested. 
are domestic spending; those to the right of the slashes are imports. A similar analysis was then 
done for 1980, assuming that the linkages were basically the same except as noted below. 
Relative expenditures for petroleum products were doubled, but all of the revenues were assumed 
to stay in Peru because it no longer imports oil. Transportation expenditures were adjusted upward 
for the same reason, but not as much. Expenditures for netting were reduced by approximately 45 
percent compared with the 1967 figures because no new boats would need to be outfitted today. 
The percentage of expenditures in other categories that went to imports was reduced because 
the secondary industries should be better able to meet today’s constant demands than those made 
during the frenetic expansion of the 1960s. Specifically, Peru could only supply 45 percent of the 
fishing boats’ equipment in 1967. This percentage should be much higher in 1980. particularly as 
a result of the Hidrostal company’s domination of the fish pump market after its innovative design 
was patented. Similarly, in 1967 the Peruvian selva’s jute bag producers could only meet 20 percent 
of the fishmeal industry’s demand. However, it was assumed that today sufficient capacity exists 
to meet the industry’s demands. Assuming the other factors were imported at a percentage equal 
to Peru’s marginal propensity to import, approximately 80 percent of expenditures in 1980 for 
intermediate goods went to domestic producers and 20 percent went to imports. 
The second and more significant adaptation made between 1967 and 1980 was the elimination 
of all expenditures for new boats, plants, and processing equipment. The surplus capacity described 
Population dynamics of the Peruvian anchovy 
Table E2. Calcu!ation of the multiplier 
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Y= c-t IT Cl-(X- Q, 
363-1 = 1711 + (939 T 369) - (700 - 1087) 
Multiplier = 
I 1 
(I - iMPC t ;LIQI = (I - (2-11 + 700 - 1087)/3634) 
= 1.77 
in the body of the report is too large to justify significant investment. However, net profits were 
assumed to be invested elsewhere or paid to the government as taxes. In crther case, these un- 
accounted-for revenues were acted upon by the multiplier, which was estirnrted to be 2.77. (See 
Table E2.) Finally, in computing the benefits of the low-tech alternative, the jute bags were assumed 
to be government subsidized to make the industry solvent, which is indicated by an asterisk in 
Table El. This policy is reasonable in view of Peru’s efforts to moderate the income differentials 
between the coast and the selva. 
Labor expenditures per million tons of anchovies harvested were computed using values for 
average boat capacity, frequency of fishing trips, and average crew wages for the modern trawlers 
and the small bolichera based on data given by Roemerllll. Fifteen-man crews were assumed for 
all boats. Roemer gives this rule of thumb based on increased reliance on machines in the purse 
seiners. Processing plants’ characteristics were also :aken from Roemer’s study. Supply fluctua- 
tions were assumed to limit average utilization to 50 percent of capacity. It was assumed that a 
high enough percentage of processing plants \vere equipped with stickwater concentration equip- 
ment to increase the ratio of fishmeal produced to raw fish processed from 18 percent to 23 percent. 
The technology existed in the 196Os, but the processors’ capital was committed to expanding gross 
plant capacity not maximizing efficiency. 
COMPETING INDUSTRIES 
A far less comprehensive analysis was made of the guano and tourism industries because of 
insufficient time and data. Tourism revenues were estimated (see Table E3). Using the following 
assumptions. Chimote, a city of roughly 100,ooO people. is the most likely place to develop into a 
tourist center because of its beaches. It was assumed that it could support a maximum of 2,000 
tourists per week or approximately 30,000 tourists per season. However, poor weather and the 
hydrogen sulfide gas emitted by decaying sea life would prevent any tourism during El Nino seasons. 
Statistics for how much an average tourist contributes to Peru’s national income were taken from 
the Latin American Statistical Abstract[l7]. These figures were scaled according to the length of 
the vedas, reasoning that longer seasons would allow the tourism industry to develop more fully 
and generate more income per tourist. It was then assumed, somewhat arbitrarily. that the standard 
of living of the residents would be affected to approximately the same extent that the tourism 
industry was hurt, so the values computed were doubled to include this externality. 
In 1970, Michael Roemer estimated that an anchovy consumed by a guano yields a marginal 
revenue that is only 12 percent as large as the marginal revenue generated by one used for fishmeal. 
Table E3. Value of guano industry 
Guano birds eat (33,000 anchoviesiyr) * (15 gms.‘anchovy) 
= 495 kglyribird 
= ,495 million metric tonslyrimillion birds 
Fish meal industry generates S11.4MiM metric tons of anchovies 
Relative income generated by guano industry .19 
Guano industry generates 5?.17M/M metric tons of anchovies 
Guano industry generates 5 I .07MlM guano birds 
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Table El. Tourism’s value 
1.000 touristsiweek. or 
30.000 touristsi 
season SlTourist 
RTime 
non El Eu’ino 
Value of Net total 
tourism value 
(million dollars) 
Vedas lasting: 
all year 9O,O@J 250 ,887 20.0 39.9 
spring 30.000 200 .84 5.0 10.1 
summer 30.000 ‘-00 ,871 5.2 10.5 
fall 3o.Ow x0 .95 5.7 I I.4 
summer and fall 60.000 ‘33 ,911 11.7 5.5 
spring and fall 60,000 233 ,895 11.5 IS.1 
spring and summer 60.000 133 ,856 I’.0 23.0 
Note: In 1976 264,000 tourists generated $113 million (1976), or 561.7 million (1967). or 5233.70 (1967) per 
tourist. 
The decreased efficiency is a result of the fact that the plankton protein moves through several 
more trophic levels in the food chain before it reaches humans. 
planktonjanchovies~guanos-*fertilizer~plants~domestic animals-+people 
Adjusting for relative changes in the prices of guano fertilizer and fishmeal, at present the figure 
is probably closer to 19 percent. The Scientific American[j] gave data for guano’s anchovy con- 
sumption. This was used to obtain the figure of approximately $1 million 1967 U.S. dollars of income 
generated per million birds per year (see Table El). 
